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INTRODUCTION
In the past several decades the treatment, habilitation and education of the mentally disabled has been heavily influenced by what
could be called the "community-first" movement. This movementwhich encompasses such developments as deinstitutionalization, the
least restrictive alternative doctrine, normalization, mainstreaming,
and outpatient commitment-is based on the idea that, in caring for
the mentally disabled, we should favor placement in the community
rather than in institutions segregated from mainstream populations.
The community-first idea is not unanimously supported.l But Congress, many courts, and countless advocacy groups composed of lawyers, mental health professionals and laypeople have rallied behind
the community first standard as a means of providing more effective
*
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This article is a slightly modified version of a speech given at the Annual
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1. See, e.g., infra notes 33 & 36.
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treatment, habilitation and education with fewer restrictions on liberty and less stigmatization.
The burden of this article is to highlight the challenges to this near
consensus. Although the community first notion clearly offers much
that is good, we should recognize that in at least some contexts it has
had significant adverse consequences. Some community-based approaches are based on flawed premises. Even if these flaws were eradicated, serious implementation problems abound. This article
examines some of these conceptual and practical problems. The purpose of canvassing the dark side of the community-first idea is to curtail blind endorsement of it and to suggest, in a broad way, reforms of
the reforms.
II. THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE COMMUNITY-FIRST
MOVEMENT
Before launching into a criticism of the community-first idea, a
brief history of its development is in order. The concept received its
first significant impetus in 1963 with the passage of the Community
Mental Health Centers Act,2 which provided federal financial incentive for the establishment of community-based outpatient treatment
for the mentally disabled. Within the past twenty-five years, in large
part because of the funding and model provided by this statute, many
communities in this country developed some capacity for outpatient
treatment of the mentally disabled.
Not long after the CMHC Act was passed, the prolonged reevaluation of the basis for civil commitment of the mentally disabled began.
The attempt to narrow the criteria for involuntary confinement by focusing on dangerousness is very familiar to anyone who has studied
the law of civil commitment. 3 Less well-known, but significantly
more important in terms of its effect on the mentally disabled, was the
parallel development of the least restrictive alternative doctrine. The
doctrine had its genesis in Lake v. Cameron.4 Judge Bazelon concluded that prior to involuntary institutionalization, the government
must bear the burden of demonstrating that no less restrictive alternatives are available. This holding, based on an interpretation of a statute, soon received constitutional status in a number of jurisdictions.5
Some courts even went so far as to find that the doctrine required the
creation of community services. In Dixon v. Weinberger,6 for in2. 42 U.S.C. § 2689 (1975)(repealed by Mental Health Systems Act of 1980).
3. See generally R. REISNER & C. SLOBOGIN, MENTAL HEALTH LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS ch. 8 (1990).

4. 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
5. See, e.g., Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. La. 1976); Davis v. Watkins,
384 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Ohio 1974).
6. 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975).
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stance, a federal court ordered the District of Columbia and federal
governments to spend money on the implementation of new treatment programs and facilities. The court in Welsch v. Likins7 also ordered development of less restrictive treatments, despite the state's
argument that the attendant expenditures would violate the state's
constitutional provision requiring a balanced budget.
The Supreme Court's more recent decision in Youngberg v. Romeo8 has been construed by many to stand for the proposition that
there is no federal constitutional right to treatment in the least restrictive environment. In Youngberg the Court rejected the lower
court's reliance on less intrusive means analysis. Instead, it held that
an individual is only entitled to minimally adequate treatment that is
reasonable in light of his or her liberty interests in safety and freedom
from unreasonable restraints, and emphasized that the treatment decided upon by qualified mental health professionals is presumptively
reasonable. Thus, it is plausible to argue that a decision by mental
health professionals that institutional treatment is adequate is presumptively constitutional even though less restrictive alternatives
have not been explored.
The fact remains that 47 states provide, by statute, that involuntarily committed patients have the right to treatment in the least restrictive available environment. 9 Indeed, a number of states go
further and specifically provide for commitment on an outpatient basis.1 0 Moreover, the constitutional arguments survive Youngberg. For
instance, one federal district court held, post-Youngberg, that a constitutional right to the least restrictive method of care or treatment exists if "professional judgment determines that such alternatives would
measurably enhance the resident's enjoyment of basic liberty interests."" Two federal courts of appeal have followed this reasoning in
finding a constitutionally-based right to community care for specific
individuals.12 Youngberg may have dampened the judicial enthusiasm
for the community-first idea as implemented through the least restric7. 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974). For a description of the district court's orders,
see 550 F.2d 1122, 1129-34 (1977).
8. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
9. Keilitz, Conn & Giampetro, Least Restrictive Treatmentof InvoluntaryPatients:
Translating Concepts into Practice,29 ST. Louis U.L.J. 691, 709 (1985).
10. As many as 42 states may permit outpatient commitment; however considerable
confusion exists as to what constitutes outpatient commitment. Miller, Commit-

ment to OutpatientTreatment. A NationalSurvey, 36 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 265 (1985).

11. Association of Retarded Citizens v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473,486 (N.D. 1982), aff'd,
713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983).
12. Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986); Thomas S. v. Morrow, 781 F.2d 367 (4th
Cir. 1986). See generally Costello & Preis, Beyond Least Restrictive Alternative:
A ConstitutionalRight to Treatmentfor Mentally Disabled Persons in the Community, 20 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1527, 1545-52 (1987).
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tive alternative doctrine, but reports of its death are greatly
exaggerated.
Parallel to the development of the least restrictive alternative doctrine as a constitutional requirement has been the statutory endorsement of this idea by the federal government. In the 1970's, Congress
passed three laws that gave further impetus to the community-first
notion. First, the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act ("DD Act"),' 3 was enacted to provide federal assistance to
programs for the developmentally disabled. It contains a preamble
listing a number of so-called congressional "findings," including a
finding that the developmentally disabled "have a right to appropriate
treatment, services and habilitation... in the setting that is least restrictive of the person's personal liberty." In PennhurstState School
v. Halderman,14 the Supreme Court held that this language did not
confer an enforceable right to treatment in the less restrictive environment, primarily on the ground that the wording of the statute was
intended to be precatory and not binding on states which accepted federal money. However, Pennhurst left open the possibility of a suit
under the federal civil rights statute designed to enforce the least restrictive setting provision of the DD Act. And even if there is no cause
of action under this language, the DD Act and its legislative history
suggest that Congress has at least symbolically jumped on the community-first, deinstitutionalization bandwagon.
A second federal statute, the Education of the Handicapped Act
("Education Act"),1s makes this abundantly clear in more concrete
ways. The Education Act obligates public schools to identify handicapped children and provide them with a "free, appropriate education" in the least restrictive environment commensurate with their
other special education needs. The intent behind this requirement is
to maximize "mainstreaming," the use of the regular education system
as a means of training and educating the handicapped, whether they
be deaf, blind, learning disabled, mentally retarded or emotionally disturbed. In Board of Educationv. Rowley,16 the Supreme Court, apparently due to financial concerns, held that the Education Act does not
require the state to provide education designed to realize the full potential of the handicapped child. However, the Court also held that
the Education Act does require the state to provide individualized instruction that will enable the child to benefit educationally. There is
no doubt that the Education Act has provided significant impetus toward integrating the education of the handicapped with the non-handicapped. Parents now have an enforcement mechanism to avoid
13.
14.
15.
16.

42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1982).
451 U.S. 1 (1981).
20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1976).
458 U.S. 176 (1982).
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segregation of their handicapped children and are using it. In California, for instance, during the first year of the Education Act's operation
there were 278 hearings concerning the propriety of educating handicapped children within the regular school system, and this number
has increased annually.' 7
A third federal statute passed in the 1970's, whose potential for bolstering the community-first idea has yet to be tested at the Supreme
Court Level, is the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act").L8
In section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Congress prohibited discrimination against handicapped individuals receiving federal financial
assistance. The recently passed Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990 ("ADA") extends this anti-discrimination prohibition to most private employers as well.19
These statutory bases for making equality-type arguments could
become extremely important in light of the Supreme Court's recently
demonstrated reluctance, in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center,2 0 to use constitutional equal protection analysis to vindicate
claims by the mentally disabled. Cleburne involved the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance which prohibited use of a building as a group
home for the mentally retarded in an area zoned to allow nursing
homes, dormitories and apartment hotels. The Court eventually concluded that the ordinance was unconstitutional as applied because in
this particular case the prohibition of the group home appeared to result from, to use the Court's words, "an irrational prejudice against
the mentally retarded."21 Nonetheless, the Court refused to hold that
statutes which allegedly discriminate on the basis of mental retardation are subject to strict scrutiny under the equal protection class; the
mentally retarded, held the Court, are neither a suspect or "quasi-suspect" class. The Court's holding permits lower courts to uphold a statute that discriminates against the mentally retarded so long as a
rational basis for the statute can be found (although, given the result
in Cleburne, the basis may have to be more "rational" than is usually
required for this tier of equal protection analysis).22 There is no doubt
that the Court would apply the same relatively lenient approach to
statutes discriminating against the mentally ill and other handicapped
individuals as well.
17. Kirst & Bertken, Due ProcessHearingsin Special Education: Some Early Findings in California,in SPECIAL EDUCATION PoLICIEs 138 (Chambers & Hartman,
eds. 1983).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. 1I 1979).
19. P.L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (July 26, 1990). [42 U.S.C. § 1201]
20. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
21. Id. at 450.
22. See, generally, Minow, When Difference Has Its Home: Group,Homes for the
Mentally Retarded,Equal ProtectionandLegal Treatment ofDifference, 22 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 111 (1987).
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To the extent constitutional equality arguments are unavailing after Cleburne, section 504 and the ADA could become very useful, especially if these statutes, like the analogous federal statutes barring
gender and race discrimination, are construed to cover discrimination
that the constitution does not reach. For instance, advocates should be
able to claim successfully that a zoning ordinance barring a group
home automatically violates section 504 if it otherwise allows living
arrangements other than single family homes.23
III.

A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF
THE COMMUNITY-FIRST IDEA

This synopsis sets the stage for a discussion of problems with the
community-first idea as implemented through legislative and judicial
pronouncements. Congress and most courts seem to accept the idea
that we should try to treat or educate as many people in the community as possible. Granted the Supreme Court, for one, seems more
concerned about cost than community-first advocates might like, but
even Rowley and C'eburne demonstrate some receptivity to the idea.
Why this emphasis on community treatment, habilitation and education? There are at least five underlying rationales. First, treatment
in the community is thought to be less of an infringement on individual liberty than placement in a segregated institution. From the legal
perspective, this is the principal impetus of the community-first movement. Second, there is the belief that integrated treatment, habilitation and education within the community (a trilogy which will
henceforth be designated as "THE") is at least as effective, if not more
so, than institutional, segregated THE. Increased effectiveness is
clearly the clinical touchstone for the entire community-first movement. Indeed, the remaining justifications are merely spinoffs of this
23. In the housing context, section 504 is probably no longer the best line of attack,
however. In 1988, Congress enacted the Fair Housing Amendment Act of 1988
providing that it is "unlawful to discriminate in the sale or rental or otherwise
make unavailable or deny a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handi-

cap." 42 U.S.C. § 3604.
The Rehabilitation Act could also be useful in other contexts. For instance,
although after Rowley neither the constitution nor the Education Act will be of
much use to plaintiffs in the same position as the Rowleys, one can argue that
§ 504 is violated whenever the state fails to expend resources for education of the
handicapped proportional to the amount of resources expended on the education

of the non-handicapped. Thus, if non-handicapped children in the school district
receive resources that enable them to realize 90% of their potential, the handicapped should receive funding at a similar level even if, in absolute terms, they
take more out of state coffers. Cf. 34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b)(1988)(Section 504 regulations requiring that the needs of the handicapped be met "as adequately as the
needs of non-handicapped children"). See generally, Guernsey, The EAHCA, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and Section 504: Statutory InteractionFollowing the Handicapped
Children's ProtectionAct of 1986, 68 NEB. L. REv. 564, 588-92 (1989).
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rationale. Third, is the belief that community THE places the mentally disabled person closer to family and friends and the emotional
sustenance these groups can provide. Fourth, community THE is
meant to facilitate what I will call "individual integration" into the
community by allowing more contacts with potential employers and
by giving the mentally disabled person practice at and "role models"
for dealing with the rest of the world. Fifth, community THE supposedly facilitates what could be called "group integration" by exposing
the mentally disabled to the non-mentally disabled and accellerating
the former group's acceptance by the latter. In other words, community THE is meant to overcome stereotyping and false stigmatization.24
It may well be that for many mentally disabled individuals community treatment often achieves these objectives. For instance, the types
of mentally retarded individuals involved in the C/eburne litigationrelatively well-adapted adults who are not committable and want or at
least do not protest the state's efforts to treat them-may benefit
from a community approach in most or all of the ways described
above. But for other groups, the assumptions about the advantages of
the community-first notion must be challenged. In particular, this article will look at two groups: mentally disabled adults meant to benefit from the least restrictive doctrine and handicapped children who
are educated through mainstreaming. In the course of discussing community treatment of these two groups, this article will make broad
assertions rather than try to criticize specific statutory language.
Again, the goal is to provoke a global reassessment of the communityfirst idea, not redraft its enabling laws.
A.

The Least Restrictive Alternative Rationale

Of course, many forms of community treatment are less physically
confining than institutional treatment. It does not necessarily follow
from this fact that the community first notion is more respectful of
individual liberty. First, community THE is not always conducted on
an outpatient basis. If the individual is merely moved from a ward in
an isolated state hospital to a ward in the community, which has often
24. A sixth reason often given for community THE is that it costs less than institutional programs. Some evidence exists that the per patient cost of an institutional
program is higher than the per patient cost of a community program for certain
types of individuals (i.e those with psychoses). See C. KIFsLER & A. SmuuN,

MENTAL HOSPITAuZATION 177 (1987). However, the same research indicates that,
for other types of individuals (ie. those with personality disorders) community
care costs more. Id. Furthermore, no research is available which compares the
cost of one hospital to the cost of the many community programs that would have
to be developed in each community to service patients from that hospital. It is
unlikely that such a study would find that alternative care costs less than
institutionalization.
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been the case in recent times,2 5 little has been accomplished by way of
increasing that person's freedom. Similarly, if the handicapped child
is taken from an institution and placed in a separate building on an
elementary school campus, again a common occurrence, 26 the phrase
"less restrictive" is hard to apply.
More significantly, to focus on physical liberty as a sole indicator of
individual autonomy is myopic. First, it is important to realize that
restrictiveness is in the eye of the "beholdee"; patients may see some
forms of non-institutional community treatment as more "restrictive"
than institutional therapy.2' Second, even from an objective standpoint, for some types of people segregated care or education may be
better, of shorter duration, or less stigmatizing than "less restrictive"
care. Indeed, more physical liberty may be useless or even harmful if
it detracts from an individual's recovery or makes it difficult to concentrate on the rehabilitative tasks at hand.28 In the end, the liberty
issue is inextricably bound up with the issue of effectiveness.
B. Effectiveness
Evaluating effectiveness is very difficult since there is such a wide
range of handicaps, each of which has unique needs, even within the
two groups focused upon in this article-adults subjected to involuntary commitment and children who are mainstreamed. Moreover, the
law's differing approaches to these two groups, particularly in terms of
the degree of coercion exerted, may have significant consequences
when addressing the effectiveness issue. The ultimate conclusion,
however, is the same with respect to both: the community-first idea,
as currently conceptualized and implemented, is not particularly
efficacious.
25. See Bachrach, Is the Least Restrictive Alternative Always the Best? Sociological
and Termantic Implications, 31 Hosp. & CoMMuNrrY PsYCHmATRY 97 (1980).
26. See infra note 56.
27. Hospital inmates commonly state a preference for seclusion rather than psychotropic medication, even though use of the latter usually results in less physically
restrictive environments. Cf. Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028, 1046
(1990)(noting that Harper stated he would rather die than take medication).
Analogously, some convicted offenders appear to prefer prison to probation because the latter disposition is of longer duration than the former and imposes
numerous restrictions on freedom of movement, etc. State Inmates Choose
Prison Over Probation,Gainesville Sun, Feb. 19, 1990, p. 7A.
28. In Least Restrictive Treatment of the Mentally Illk
A Doctrine in Search of Its
Senses, 14 SAN DIEGO L. Rsv. 110, 1139-43 (1977), Hoffman and Foust make this
eminently clear. For instance, they point out that "[so] desperate may be the
need of such patients for less, rather than more stimulation, that some authors
question whether the normal hospital environment is sufficiently tranquil." Id.
n. 119. See also, Goldberg & Rubin, Recovery of PatientsDuringPeriods of Supposed Neglect, 37 BRrr. J. MED.PSYCHIAT. 265 (1964).

19901

TREATMENT OF THE MENTALLY DISABLED

421

1. Involuntary Care
Turning first to the involuntary commitment context, there is no
doubt that many of the treatments currently provided in hospitals can
also be provided in the community, on an outpatient basis. This fact,
combined with the liberty interests meant to be furthered by the least
restrictive alternative doctrine, has led a number of states to enact
provisions permitting outpatient commitment or some other type of
forced care in the community rather than in an isolated state hospital.29 However, there are countless problems with the outpatient commitment concept.
Most fundamentally, a plausible argument can be made from the
modern, libertarian perspective, that outpatient commitment is either
meaningless or so subversive it should be abandoned. If we are serious
about limiting involuntary civil commitment to those who are clearly
and convincingly dangerous to self or others, then candidates for outpatient treatment will be rare indeed, because the imminently very
dangerous almost always require institutionalization. 30 Even if we are
willing to expand the committable group to include anyone who is so
severely mentally disabled as to be dysfunctional, it is unlikely the
outpatient commitment net would catch many more persons, since
these people also would find it very difficult to exist outside an institution. Not surprisingly, however, outpatient statutes are being utilized.
How is this possible? Presumably, civil commitment criteria are being
interpreted broadly so as to include those nondangerous people and
those competent people who are diagnosable and potentially treatable.31 Ironically, outpatient commitment, which is seen by many libertarians as the logical extension of protection against undue
deprivations of liberty, could have the opposite effect. It could easily
undo the rewards - as minimal as they are - of two decades of legal
battles aimed at narrowing the commitment criteria.
Even assuming this significant conceptual problem can be overcome,32 there are several practical obstacles to effective outpatient
29. See supra note 10.
30. DeRisi & Vega, The Impact of Deinstitutionalizationin California'sState Hospital Population,34 HosP. & CoMMUNrY PSYCHIATRY 140, 144 (1983); Sheridan &
Teplin, Recidivism in Difficult Patients: Differences Between Community
MentalHealth Centerand State HospitalAdmissions, 138 AM. J.PSYCHIATRY 688,
689 (1981).
31. Indeed, in some states, the criteria for outpatient commitment are explicitly relaxed. See Stefan, Preventive Commitment The Concept and Its Pitfalls, 11
MENTAL DIsABmIT L. REP. 288 (1987).
32. One could argue that outpatient commitment is a lesser deprivation of liberty
than hospitalization and therefore does not require the same level of justification.
The question then arises as to how to enforce treatment: if a patient committed
on an outpatient basis solely on the ground that the patient needs treatment fails
to take medication, hospitalization is not possible. At the least, outpatient corn-

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:413

commitment. First and foremost is the shameful lack of treatment

facilities in virtually every community in the country. 33 Until state
and local governments are willing to provide money for such facilities,
outpatient treatment, even if it makes sense theoretically, will be ineffective for large numbers of persons because appropriate treatment
will not be available. Admittedly, there are CMHCs in many communities. However, as one commentator has noted, the ex-hospital patients released through the deinstitutionalization movement are not
being served by these centers. As he puts it, "quite apart from the
centers' uneven geographical distribution and their current fiscal
problems, both their ideology and their most common services are not
directed at the needs of those who have traditionally resided in state
psychiatric institutions." 34 Given this situation, outpatient commitment is unlikely to work well. When deciding upon the disposition of
a person who meets the criteria for civil commitment, a judge who
must choose between either institutional treatment and nothing, or
institutional treatment and a community program designed for other
types of individuals, will have little difficulty choosing the former option in both instances.
Even when appropriate facilities exist, as noted earlier, 35 the
problems of institutionalization are often replicated in the community.
Particularly with respect to the chronically mentally ill, deinstitutionalization has often meant reinstitutionalization in nursing homes and
other facilities, a situation which, as one commentator has put it, is
"replete with its own failings and shortcomings."3 6 For the nonchronically ill, community placement is supposed to lessen the chance
of rehospitalization, but there is at least some evidence of a "revolving
door" cycle in the community hospital psychiatric units and emergency rooms reminiscent of the experience at state hospitals. 3 7 It has
even been suggested that outpatient treatment can encourage sick bemnitment should be permitted only if the state can show that the person will be
harmful to self or others if treatment is not monitored on an outpatient basis. Cf.
AusmcAN BAR ASSOCIATION CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARD

§§ 7-7.4(d), at 7-382 and accompanying commentary (1984).
33. Brown & Bremer, Inadequate Means to a Noble End. The Right to Treatment
Paradox,6 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 45, 58-59 (1978); Scull, A New Trade in Lunacy:
The Recommodication of the Mental Patient,8 Am.BEHAv. SCIENTIST 741, 74344 (1981).
34. Scull, supranote 33, at 724,743-44 (1981). See also Lamb, Deinstitutionlizationat
the Crossroads,39 Hosp. & CommuNITY PsYCHIATRY 941 (1988); E. F. Torrey, Nowhere to Go: The Tragic Odessey of the Homeless Mentally Ill142-51 (1988).
35. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
36. Goldman, Deinstitutionalization:The DataDymythologized, 34 HOSp. & COMMuNITY PSYCHIATRY 129 (1983). See also Schmidt, The Mentally Ill in Nursing
Homes: New Back Wards in the Community, 34 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 687
(1987); Scull, supra note 33, at 744-50.
37. DeRisi & Vega, supra note 30, at 144.
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havior, at least in those charged with criminal offenses who have been
found incompetent to stand trial and may otherwise be convicted.3 8
Schwartz and Costanzo discuss a number of other problems with
outpatient commitment that are likely to affect treatment efficacy.39
These include the difficulty of compelling compliance with a treatment regimen when walls and locked doors can no longer be used as
an enforcement mechanism, the resistance of community mental
health professionals to the coercive nature of outpatient treatment
and the greater likelihood of liability, the intrusion of judges into the
treatment relationship due to the need to monitor continued adherence to treatment plans, and the likelihood of hostile community reaction to the presence of mentally disabled individuals. Schwartz and
Costanzo predict that outpatient commitment will become synonymous with forced medication, with all the constitutional and operational difficulties that approach occasions.
Despite all of these problems, one might still argue that community treatment is better than hospital treatment. Any attempt to suggest the contrary must confront Kiesler's review of research involving
institutionalized treatment and alternative care.40 Kiesler very carefully examined the entire universe of studies comparing the two types
of treatment using randomized assignment. He concluded that "alternative care is more effective and less expensive [and is better at]
keep[ing] people out of the hospital."41
This finding is probably accurate, as far as it goes, but it does not
mean that institutional treatment comes in second in all or even most
cases in the context at issue here. First, as Kiesler himself admits,
there are some flaws in the research. For instance, he points out that
the alternative care programs studied, which were generally quite innovative, were compared to traditional, not necessarily the best, hospital programs.42 Moreover, he admits, many of these innovative
alternative care programs might work just as well (if not better?) in a
hospital, yet were not tried there.43 In addition, rehospitalizationthe outcome variable most often used in the research reviewed by
Kiesler as a means of testing the success or failure of the treatments
38. D. WExLER, MENAL HEALTH LAW 122 (1981). Note, however, that outpatient

commitment makes more sense in the competency to stand trial setting, because
restorability,not dangerousness, is the issue. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715
(1972). In contrast to those who are imminently dangerous to self or others,
many of those found incompetent to stand trial can be effectively treated on an
outpatient basis.
39. Schwartz & Costanso, Compelling Treatmentin the Community: DistortedDoctrines and Violated Values, 20 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 1329, 1377-97 (1987).
40. C. KIESLER & A. SLBulIIN, supra note 24.

41. Id. at 179.
42. Id. at 173.
43. Id. at 176.
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studied - is suspect. As Kiesler notes,44 the best predictor of
whether someone will be hospitalized is whether he or she has been
hospitalized in the past. The greater rehospitalization of those treated
in hospitals compared to those who were not may merely reflect the
preferences of their admitting clinicians or the influence of past decisions by other clinicians.
Even accepting the research on its face, the conclusion that community care might be more effective than institutionalized care in the
isolated situations reviewed by Kiesler does not mean that it works
better in all situations. It will still probably distort the commitment
criteria, fail miserably to the extent society is unwilling to foot the
bill, result in its own revolving door problems, and occasion the headaches outlined by Schwartz and Costanzo. Moreover, as Kiesler notes,
the research does not prove that every type of individual involved in
the studies will do better in alternative care; the possibility remains
that some subgroups will receive better treatment in a hospital. 45 In
addition, in all of the studies, the impact of alternative care diminished
considerably after one or two years. That is, those treated in the hospital were rarely worse off than those treated in the community at the
end of this period. 46 Finally, and most importantly, although Kiesler
states that all the studies involved patients who were "seriously ill,"47
it is unlikely that any of the studies involved patients who were considered imminently dangerous to self or others. It is hard to imagine
the local judiciary (or most mental health professionals) allowing random assignment of such patients to the hospital or alternative care.46
If this assumption is correct, Kiesler's conclusion is close to meaningless in the context with which we are concerned - the treatment of
those subjected to involuntary hospitalization.
One might well point out that provision of community services for
those who want them is not nearly as problematic; if this is the group
focused upon, Kiesler's research is likely to be relevant and the
problems with coercion identified by Schwartz and Costanzo are nonexistent. However, as stated at the outset, this article looks at conceptual and practical problems with the law as it is currently conceived
and implemented. To date, no court and no state legislature has been
44. Id. at 179.
45. The authors state that their conclusion about the superior quality of community
care "may not be true for all disorders, age groups, etc. Insufficient detail is provided in these studies to assess such questions even preliminarily." Id. at 177.
46. Id. at 175.
47. Id. at 173.
48. Cf. Mills & Cummins, DeinstitutionalizationReconsidered, 5 INTVL J.L. & Psy.
CHIATRY 271, 276 (1982)(a review of studies concluding that the studies showing
clearly favorable outcomes for community treatment had excluded the most severely disturbed patients, while those that included this group show community
treatment was not as successful).
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willing to provide a constitutional or statutory right to community
mental health treatment services for the general populace. It must be
remembered that the least restrictive alternative idea developed as a
limitation on the state's attempts to force institutionalized treatment
on its citizens; thus, in analyzing the doctrine, involuntary outpatient
commitment is the correct focal point. This part of the article has
shown that, in terms of effectiveness, the community-first idea in the
involuntary commitment context has significant shortcomings.
2.

Voluntary Care

Even when government is willing to extend an entitlement to community services to an entire population, as Congress has done with the
Education Act, serious questions of effectiveness can arise. As in the
involuntary commitment context, conceptual and practical problems
detract from the effectiveness of mainstreaming the handicapped for
educational purposes.
The biggest conceptual problem with the Education Act is that it
rests on conflicting premises. The Education Act's most interesting
feature is its emphasis on the individual child. Each child who is identified as handicapped is to be educated according to an Individualized
Educational Program ("IEP") developed by school authorities in collaboration with the parents of the child4 9 This aspect of the Education Act is commendable when viewed in isolation. Yet the Education
Act also requires that the IEP be implemented, whenever feasible,
through the regular educational system.50 As many commentators
have pointed out, 51 this latter system is based on a premise diametrically opposed to the individualized approach. Children in the regular
school system are handled according to categories - that is, grades,
tracks or age - rather than as individuals with unique characteristics.
Moreover, the types of educational resources they receive are based on
their ability to satisfy certain universally applied requirements, not on
their need for a particular type of training or education, as is the case
with the handicapped. The Education Act thus requires two different
educational paradigms to operate at once - the first based on individualized needs, the second based on categorically-defined abilities.
The paradigmatic clash plays itself out in several ways. Under the
Education Act, for instance, school authorities and parents are supposed to cooperate in devising the IEP.52 This collaborative process is
49. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(19), 1414(a)(5)(1988).

50. Id. § 1414(a)(1)(C).
51. See, e-g., Bartlett, The Role of Cost in EducationalDecisionmakingfor the Handicapped Child, 48 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 7,19-26 (1985); Hill, Legal Conflicts in
Special Education: How Competing Paradigmsin the Educationfor All Handicapped Children Act CreateLitigation, 64 DET. C.L. REV. 129, 142-48 (1986).

52. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(a)(1)(C)(iii), 1415(b)(1)(D)(1988).
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meant to facilitate identification of the child's needs. Yet it has frequently failed to work. School officials, operating under the norms of
the traditional system, tend to classify handicapped children according
to diagnoses or other relatively general labels, while parents, who are
of course very familiar with their child, tend to view them as a composite of unique traits. It is not surprising that studies of the IEP development process contemplated by the Education Act indicate that
the schools often ignore parents' input, at least until the parents initiate litigation. 53
Even if there is agreement on the child's needs, there is often disagreement over how to meet those needs. School administrators are
used to allocating resources on an institution-wide basis, and to the
extent they consider individuals or smaller groups at all in making
such decisions, they are likely to reward merit. Yet when it comes to
handicapped children, the Education Act requires them to focus on
individual rather than institutional needs; moreover, given the high
cost of educating the handicapped (which on average is twice the costper-pupil), it asks them to do so in inverse proportion to merit. Administrators find this hard to do. Naturally enough, their definition
of "appropriate education," which the Education Act requires be given
to every handicapped child, is likely to weigh institutional concerns
over the individual concerns of the handicapped. Their emphasis is on
what is available institutionally rather than what might be made available on an individual basis.5 4 Needs of the handicapped are dubbed
psychological or medical rather than educational (thus avoiding the
mandate of the Education Act) when they are not easily handled by
the school's current curriculum.5 5 Of those whose needs are considered educational, the vast majority are still segregated from their
6
schoolmates, analogous to the treatment of the civilly committed.5
53. Clune & Van Pelt, A PoliticalMethod of Evaluatingthe Educationfor All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 and the Several Gaps of Gap Analysis, 48 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS.7, 33 n.159 (1985)(citing Thouvenelle, Study of Proceduresfor
Determining the Least Restrictive EnvironmentPlacementof HandicappedChildren: Final ProjectReport 3.14-3.22 (1980)). See also, id.at 19; Wegner, Variations on a Theme: The Concept of Equal Educational Opportunity and
ProgrammingDecisions Under the Educationfor All HandicappedChildrenAct
of 1975;48 LAw & CoNTEmp. PRoBS. 169, 174-76 (1985).

54. Miller & Miller, The HandicappedChild's Civil Right as It Relates to the "Least
Restrictive Environment" and Appropriate Mainstreaming, 54 IND. L.J. 1, 5
(1978); Note, Board of Educationv. Rowley: HandicappedChildren Entitled to a
Beneficial Education, 69 IowA L. REv. 279, 286-87 (1983).
55. See, e.g., In re Bill D., [1980-81 Dec.] Educ. Handicapped L. Rep. (CRR) 502:259

(SEA Conn. Jan. 17, 1981); In re Carlisle Area School District, [1982-83 Dec.]
Educ. Handicapped L. Rep. (CRR) 504:194 (SEA Pa. Aug. 23, 1982).
56. See, e.g., St Louis Parents Assn., 591 F. Supp. 1416,1451 n.73 (W.D. Mo. 1984)(85%
of handicapped are educated in specially designed buildings); Position Paper,
Florida Advocacy Center for Persons with Disabilities (1987)(87.2% of mentally
handicapped in Florida are placed in special class or separate schools).
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If the handicapped child is mainstreamed, other problems arise,
again stemming from tension between the two education paradigms.
School authorities would prefer to treat handicapped children like
other children as much as possible when it comes to teaching, grading
and discipline. But if they do so, they could easily violate the aims of
the Education Act. For instance, the Education Act requires that the
needs of handicapped children be satisfied in the least restrictive environment. Therefore, expulsion for disciplinary purposes, which results in a return to a special education setting, is impossible unless the
school once again meets with the parents to devise a new plan. This
obligation to provide special treatment again rubs school officials the
wrong way. As one commentator has pointed out:
[Tihe school administrator is forced to operate two systems within the same
school: one based on rules and structure, the other on standards and flexibility. Faced with administrative schizophrenia, he may attempt to resolve the
problem by asserting the norms of the dominant system over those of the

subordinate
system When he does, he conflicts with the statute and litigation
57
results.

The paradigm clash re-emerges during litigation, where resistance
to individualization results in a triumph of form over substance. In
particular, school boards often rely on their attention to the procedures of the Education Act as a defense in suits which allege their
failure to individualize education. Judges, who tend to be rule-oriented as well, often find the defense valid.58 One finds in much of the
litigation a fixation by both bureaucrats and courts on procedural fairness rather than on substantive fairness.
Even if the parents "win" on the substantive issue, one wonders
how effective the child's subsequent education will be. In the law of
contracts, it is well-accepted doctrine that specific performance of a
personal service will rarely be granted; damages is the preferred remedy. If Liz Taylor breaches a contract to perform in Cleopatra, the
court will require her to pay a multi-million dollar sum, not force her
to assume the role. The reasons should be obvious: while one can
make a contractor finish a building according to specifications, it is
very difficult to monitor the quality of an actress' performance; indeed, it is very possible Liz will do everything in her considerable
power to ruin the production in ways that cannot be rectified. Under
the Education Act, a financial remedy makes little sense. The only
57. Hill, supra note 51, at 153.
58. Clune & Van Pelt, supra note 53, at 193; Sindelar, How and Why the Law Has
Failed: A HistoricalAnalysis ofServices for the Retarded in North Carolinaand
a Prescriptionfor Change, 48 LAw & CoNTEmp. PROBs. 125, 126 (1985). Apparently, the Department of Education routinely refuses to investigate substantive
aspects of complaints under the Education Act, so long as procedural requirements are met. Tucker, Section 504 of the RehabilitationAct After Ten Years of
Enforcement The Cost and the Future,1989 ILL. L. REV. 845, 867 (1989).
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remedy that parents can seek is performance by the defendant school,
performance of a very sophisticated service. Granted, schools may not
be as quixotic as Ms. Taylor, but the possibility of subtle sabotage is
surely there.
This is not to suggest that school authorities and courts don't care
about individual handicapped children. They may care about them as
much as they care about any other student in the system. However,
the attitudes inculcated by that system make it difficult for them to
respond in the ways required by the Education Act. These attitudes
are likely to persist on the part of school administrators. Indeed, one
could argue that they are a necessary foundation of our regular school
system.
Thus, it is worthwhile to question whether, as currently implemented, mainstreaming is a good idea if effective institutional programs can also be made available. The facts of Rowley provide a
perfect example of the dilemma posed. In that case, the Supreme
Court was confronted with an extremely intelligent plaintiff who happened to be deaf and thus was able to comprehend less than half of
what was said in the classroom unless provided the assistance of a sign
language interpreter. The school was unwilling to provide such an interpreter, however, because it burdened institutional resources and
because, even without an interpreter, Rowley was able to do well
enough to progress from grade to grade. Rowley was not receiving
individualized instruction but rather was thrust into the grade appropriate for her age; she was being gauged according to merit rather
than need.5 9 Nonetheless, the Court agreed with the school in finding
her education appropriate and not in violation of the Education Act.
The Court emphasized that the school had followed the procedures
mandated by the Education Act and was providing education that was
60
of some benefit to the plaintiff.

Amy Rowley's mainstream education, as sanctioned by the Court,
is no better, and is probably worse, than the education she would receive in a school for the deaf where teachers would be able to sign or
automatically provided with interpreters. One can certainly argue
that the Court's decision is erroneous, but it is not surprising, given
61
the premises of traditional education.
59. The District Court found that Amy "is advancing easily from grade to grade" but
"understands less of what goes on in class than she could if she were not deaf"
and thus "is not learning as much, or performing as well academically, as she
would without her handicap." Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,185 (1982).
60. Id. at 209-10.
61. Moreover, a finding in favor of the Rowleys could have had several drawbacks:
disgruntled administrators and teachers, disrupted classrooms, and perhaps added pressure on Amy, whose use of an interpreter would likely be conspicuous.
See infra text accompanying notes 63-67 for further discussion of this point. The
tension between the two different educational paradigms is not easily resolved.
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This article has tried to demonstrate that the community-first idea,
as currently implemented, may not result in more effective treatment,
habilitation or education than that provided in a segregated institutional setting. To this point effectiveness has been defined rather narrowly. Yet to be considered are other attributes of community THE
that might make it an attractive option, namely the fact that it facilitates contact with loved ones and promotes individual and group integration. The analysis of these supposed advantages of the communityfirst idea will be even briefer but enough will be said to suggest that
these claims are also suspect.
C. Family Contacts
There is no doubt that mainstreaming allows children to be closer
to their parents than would be the case if education took place in some
far-off institution. Those committed to outpatient treatment will also
likely be closer to loved ones. Moreover, regardless of how effective
community treatment might otherwise be, this arrangement is probably good in and of itself. However, the claim that THE in the community is beneficial because it keeps persons who are mentally disabled
close to home makes sense only if there is a worthwhile home to be
close to. Particularly with respect to those subjected to involuntary
civil commitment it is frequently the case that no significant others
exist, or that those who do exist will only detract from the effectiveness of care. Very often it is a relative, tired of caring for or putting up
with the sick or dysfunctional individual, who initiates the institutionalization process in the first place.6 2 One does not need a Freudian
background to believe that family dynamics can perpetuate a person's
sickness or psychosocial maladjustment. In these circumstances, institutionalization may be preferable to outpatient treatment or local habilitation and education. Yet, current statutes encouraging or
mandating community THE make no effort to differentiate between
those who can benefit from proximity to certain individuals in the
community and those who cannot.
D.

Individual Integration

Probably the strongest argument in favor of community THE is
that it facilitates integration of the mentally disabled individual into
the community. Ensconced in an institution far from the "real world",
such an individual, even if his or her primary mental problem is successfully treated, may find it difficult to acquire the psychosocial skills
One possible, but improbable, resolution is to individualize the entireeducational
system.
62. See Dix,Acute PsychiatricHospitalizationof the Mentally Ill in the Metropolis:
An EmpiricalStudy, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 485, 503.
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necessary for adequate assimilation in the community once released.
Community THE probably makes it easier to acquire these skills and,
at the same time, makes it easier to find employment or other conditions in which the skills can be applied.
The only question advanced here is whether integration is ever feasible for any but the most "normal" mentally disabled individuals. If
most mentally disabled people do not have sufficient capacity to function in society, then only a few will benefit from community THE.
Even if a large number of them have such capacity, it is reasonable to
ask whether their potential will be realized given the rest of society's
attitude toward them. Ultimately, individual integration is a function
of group integration, the fifth justification for community THE.
E.

Group Integration

The rationale behind group integration is as follows: only if the
mentally disabled become familiar to and interact with the rest of society will they have any chance at successful assimilation into the community. Otherwise, "irrational prejudices," to use the Supreme
Court's language in C/eburne6O, will persist and even those mentally
disabled persons who are qualified will be discriminated against in
subtle ways that can make it difficult for them to recover fully or
function to the best of their ability.
The mentally disabled have often been compared in this regard to
minorities. The Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education64 was based, not so much on proof that schools for blacks were
inherently unequal in quality to schools for whites, but on the notion
that separate education of blacks would symbolize continued diminishment of their status and prevent them from being taken seriously
as members of society. Analogously, so the argument goes, the mentally disabled should be educated and treated in the community with
the rest of the populace, or prejudices against them will be perpetuated and their position in society will remain precarious.
Unfortunately, when the focus is mentally disabled persons who
are committable or who require special educational services, it is easy
to harbor doubts about the validity of the thesis that familiarity breeds
acceptance. As Professor Minow has argued, discrimination based on
perceived differences usually does not depend upon the extent to
which those who are different are physically integrated with the rest
of the population. 65 Just as segregation can stigmatize the mentally
disabled by marking them as different, incautious integration can stig63. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985).
64. 347 U.S. 483 (1954)(separate but equal doctrine found to be unconstitutional).
65. Minow, Learning to Live With the Dilemma of Difference: Bilingual and Special Education, 48 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157 (1985).
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matize the disabled by making painfully obvious their difficulties. The
deaf child who needs an interpreter, the emotionally disturbed child
who receives "counselling," and the mentally retarded child who attends special classes clearly become more conspicuous and very possibly more alien to the rest of society when their needs are met by the
public schools instead of a segregated institution. The number of instances in which communities have attempted to remove group homes
from their midst suggests that outpatient treatment may produce the
same result.
Ultimately, Minow suggests this "dilemma of difference" can be
overcome through integration, but only if differences are treated as
aspects of the community's identity rather than as evidence of inequality or lower status. For example, rather than singling out the deaf
child who has been mainstreamed by providing her an interpreter or
requiring her to attend special classes after regular hours, the entire
class could be taught sign language. This approach, Minow asserts,
would be effective in "making the hearing-impaired child's difference
no longer signify stigma or isolation while still responding to that difference as an issue for the entire community."66 As another example,
Minow suggests that all students, not just those who are handicapped,
spend different days or portions of different days in different settings,
with different mixes of children and teachers. As she states, "a real
mix of special classes could modulate the implicit hierarchy of such
extra classes, and diminish the implication that difference resides in
the unusual student rather than in all the students." 67
The problem with Minow's approach is that, as she readily admits,68 it can be extremely hard to implement. If we do not create
programs that treat the differences of the mentally disabled as one
type of difference among many rather than as a special problem area,
then we are left with the dilemma that Minow describes. Under such
circumstances, the community-first notion may not be better than institutional programs at producing effective assimilation of the mentally disabled.69 Seperate but equal institutions may make more
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 208.
Id. at 209.
Id. at 208.
Most of the research indicates that unless integration of the type described by
Minow takes place, mainstreaming is conceptually and practically problematic.
Taylor, Caught in the Continuum A CriticalAnalysis of the Principle of the
Least Restrictive Environment, 13 J. A. SEVERELY HANDICAPPED 41 (1988)(arguing that the least restrictive environment idea is outmoded and should be replaced by a policy of integration, meaning the elimination of social, cultural,
economic, and administrative barriers to community integration and encouragement of relationships between people with developmental disabilities and nondisabled people). See also Hamre-Nietupski, Enhancing Integration of Students
with Severe DisabilitiesThrough CurricularInfusion: A General/SpecialEducator Partnership,in EDUCATION AND TRAINING OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED 78
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sense, assuming the institutions are indeed "equal" in quality.
IV. CONCLUSION
Perhaps we should not even try to bring about assimilation of the
mentally disabled. We may be morally bound to do so in the case of
minorities, whose "condition" can be blamed on the majority. Moreover, we need minorities in the community for the community to survive. But why should we attempt to bring into society a class of
people, a large number of whom have great difficulty engaging in social dialogue and contributing to the works of the community? Do we
really have any communal relationship with them?
Professor Burt believes the answer to this latter question is yes:
It is [admittedly] paradoxical that handicapped people must depend on
others' assistance in order to achieve their goal of independence from others.
But in this paradoxical dependence, handicapped people resemble everyone
who, in striving for independent autonomy, is nonetheless constrained by an
inescapable economic and social network
of interrelated dependencies-eve70
ryone, that is, in America today."

In other words, Professor Burt argues, our communal relationship
with the mentally disabled, even those who are severely disabled, lies
in the fact that everyone needs help in becoming a functioning member of the community. We should recognize in their plight the plight
of all of us.
Yet accepting this argument, which I do, does not mean that current efforts to bring about a greater sense of community are appropri(1989); Hamre-Nietupski & Nietupski, IntegralInvolvement of Severely Handicapped Students Within Regular PublicSchools, 6 TASH 30 (1981); Stainback &
Stainback, A Review of Research on InteractionsBetween Severely Handicapped
and NonhandicappedStudents, 6 J. A. SEVERELY HANDICAPPED 23 (1981); Voeltz,
Effects of Structured Interactions with Severely Handicapped Peers on Children's Attitudes, 86 AM. J. MENTAL DEFICiENCY 380 (1982); J. GEARHART & A.
WEISHAHN, THE HANDICAPPED STUDENT IN THE REGULAR CLAssROOM 90 (2d. ed.
1980) (if more than physical integration is not achieved, handicapped students
may become "more severely and directly stigmatized, stereotyped, and rejected"
than if they had stayed in their segregated classrooms.)
Unfortunately, since Rowley, although the lower courts have finetuned mainstreaming analysis, they have paid little attention to these concerns. The emphasis has been on physical integration, to the exclusion of other issues. Indeed, the
leading case, Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1983), stated that even if a
placement is considered better for academic reasons, it may not be the appropriate placement if it fails to mainstream the child. Id. at 1063. While this holding is
not surprising, given the language of the Act, its emphasis on mainstreaming
rather than efficacy is troublesome. See also Gillette v. Fairland Bd. of Educ., 725
F. Supp. 343 (S.D. Ohio 1989); A.W. v. Northwest R-1 School Dist., 813 F.2d 158
(8th Cir. 1987). A more sophisticated approach is provided in Daniel R.1I v. State
Bd. of Educ., 874 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1989).
70. Burt, ConstitutionalLaw and the Teaching of Parables,93 YALE L.J. 455, 492-93
(1984).
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ate. We should reject reliance on outpatient commitment as currently
conceptualized. We should engage in mainstreaming only if we are
willing to reorient the learning process in ways that are truly integrated. Otherwise, we could easily be making matters worse.

